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Introduction
For over a decade Western research in the field of Chinese political and
social developments have focused on the societal side of the state-soci-
ety relationship, stimulating a plethora of studies on civil society and
Chinese non-governmental developments.1  This emphasis on society
and social phenomena has had the effect of pushing research of the
state and party out of the ruling paradigm. Although it seems that the
state as a focus of enquiry has been brought back in in recent years,2 the
role of the party is still thoroughly neglected.
Lack of attention to the role of the party seems to be related to the
widespread belief that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a thing
of the past, which has difficulties surviving in the modern globalized
world. Adherents of this view point to the party's absence in the grow-
ing private sector. They argue that new social groups and strata have
emerged with considerable economic power, which is bound to turn
into political power, thereby challenging the dominant role of the party.
They also argue that the young Chinese do not see party membership
as a prerequisite to their career advancement, because the most inter-
esting and well-paid jobs (in both the private and the joint venture sec-
tors) are not dependent on party membership. A logical consequence of
this line of thought is that the CCP is doomed and will ultimately suffer
the same fate as the Soviet and East European Communist Parties and
collapse, resulting in a new political order characterized by democrati-
zation and power-sharing among different social forces and groups.
I have argued elsewhere that it is too early to pronounce the party
obsolete, if not dead.3  In fact, in recent years the party has gradually
strengthened its hold over Chinese society. In personnel management
the party has recaptured some of the powers it had handed over to the
state personnel departments in 1988. Moreover in the ideological sphere,
the ongoing campaign of  the ’Three Representations' (sange daibiao)
ultimately is about strengthening the role of the party in modern Chi-
nese society. In order to grasp these developments, it is time to 'bring
the party back in' – to paraphrase the famous 'Bringing the State Back
In' call by Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol in their book on the role
of the state.4  It is time to realize that the current lack of awareness in the
China field of the crucial role of the party has translated into insuffi-
cient understanding of the Chinese political trajectory and the political
processes taking place in the transition to the post Jiang Zemin era.
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Significantly, it was recently decided to admit private entrepreneurs
into the Chinese Communist Party. This decision has given rise to con-
siderable debate in China and many conservative leaders have voiced a
concern that this will totally change the composition as well as the his-
torical mission of the party. Jiang Zemin has answered these concerns
by launching a massive campaign under the name of the ‘Three Repre-
sentations’ (sange daibiao). This proposes that the party should repre-
sent the most advanced culture, the most advanced productive forces,
and the fundamental interests of the majority of the population. Thus
Jiang Zemin has initiated a strategy of co-optation vis-à-vis the new
economic elites. This demonstrates considerable flexibility on the part
of the party in its attempt not to be overtaken and made superfluous by
the reform and modernization process.
New figures indicate that the proportion of officials, technicians and
public enterprise managers has risen to more than 50 percent of total
party membership. Peasant membership has declined from nearly 70
percent in the late 1950s to about 35 percent, with workers now only
constituting about 15 percent. Thus important changes in the composi-
tion of the party are taking place. Will this process of co-optation suc-
ceed? Will the new social groups and elites strengthen the party or erode
its organizational capacity? Foreign-funded enterprises are classified
as private enterprises in most Chinese statistics. Will Chinese manag-
ers from this sector also be admitted to the party? Clearly, the party is
searching for new ways to enlarge its base in Chinese society; indeed,
according to new statistics, the party is recruiting new members at a
rate of  more than a million a year.5
The papers in this volume address the above-mentioned issues in
their contextual theoretical and empirical richness. The  paper by David
Shambaugh deals with the relationship between the party and the army.
He also introduces a third actor in the Chinese political system, namely
the state, and argues that since the mid-1990s a 'subterranean struggle'
over the jurisdictional control of the army has been played out between
the army, party and government in China.  However, even though the
army has sought greater autonomy from the party and the government,
for its part, has tried to increase its jurisdictional control over the army, an
'essential symbiosis' between the ruling party and the army continues to
exist. In this sense the PLA is still a party-army rather than a national army.
In her contribution, Heike Holbig discusses the party and private
entrepreneurs in China. This is an issue that has acquired some urgency
since Jiang Zemin put forward the 'Three Representations' in February
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2000. At the recently held 16th Party Congress this 'important think-
ing', as the Chinese call it, was written into the party constitution along-
side 'Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping
Theory', thereby given the formal green light for admitting private en-
trepreneurs into the party. Heike Holbig discusses the motives and strat-
egies behind the new policy of co-opting the private entrepreneurs. She
also analyzes available information on the private sector in order to clarify
the often confusing Chinese terminology on this issue.
Zheng Yongnian deals with the transformation of the CCP from the
perspective of interest representation. Traditionally the CCP represents
the interests of five major groups in Chinese society: workers, peasants,
intellectuals, members of the PLA and government officials and cadres.
As a consequence of Jiang Zemin’s 'Three Representations', the party
will now also be representing the interests of the private entrepreneurs
and 'other outstanding elements' from the non-state sector. However,
although the CCP has begun to consider the interests of newly rising
classes and social groups, the primary aim is not to initiate a democra-
tization process, but to bolster one-party domination.
In their contribution Ryosei Kokubun and Kazuko Kojima focus on
the role of the party at the local level. In recent years the danwei system
has been emptied of many of its functions. Instead the role of the local
residential community has been strengthened. In many cities several
Residents’ Committees have been combined to form new Shequ Resi-
dents’ Commitees, which often consist of an area (shequ) with 1,000-
2,000 families. The party has realized the importance of strengthening
its presence in these new local organizations in order to be able to coun-
ter 'unhealthy practices' at grassroots level, such as the Falun Gong,
and it has attempted to organize the local party members under the
local party organization. However, many CCP members have taken lit-
tle interest in local community activities and as the shequ performs gov-
ernment activities there is a widespread feeling that the party should
not become too involved. In line with the general slogan of  the separa-
tion of party and government, the view is that the party should just set
the overall guidelines and function simply as the 'directive core'.
Børge Bakken discusses party ideology. He argues that the CCP once
was based on an ideology that was fundamentally linked to social norms
and values. The rationalized and bureaucratized party of today lacks
these links. Consequently, ideological campaigns are linked to norms
of an order other than the social – they are exemplary norms. It is an
open question whether the latest important campaign, that of the the
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'Three Representations', will turn out to be yet another 'cynical game'
with party ideology or instead the start of a process of party renewal
and modernization.
The final paper by Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard is an overview of the changes
that recently took place at the 16th Party Congress in China. The paper
lists the new members of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Com-
mittee and discusses issues such as educational background, age, and
regional representation. It concludes that the Chinese succession pro-
cess for the first time has taken place in a peaceful and deliberate man-
ner, observing norms and rules that have been introduced at lower lev-
els in recent years.
November 2002 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard
Editor
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